Murat Yetkin wrote: July 15, 15 questions

Journalist Murat Yetkin wrote 15 questions about the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, in his article published in YetkinReport .

Murat Yetkin began his article by saying, “As a citizen who, instead of sitting in the safety of his home on the evening of July 15, 2016, rushed to the newspaper he managed, tried to dissuade the putschists with a gun pointed at his face when the newspaper was printed, settled scores with them in court, and took part in delegations that explained the inner workings of the coup to European countries upon a proposal from the unofficial Turkey Democracy Platform, I believe I have the right to ask these questions.” He then asked the following 15 questions:

1. As early as the fall of 2015, MIT began cracking the secret ByLock program used by members of the illegal Fethullah Gülen organization within the state and exposing their communications. Initial lists of the Turkish Armed Forces' structure were submitted to the General Staff so that precautions could be taken before the Supreme Military Council. When the Gülenists learned of this, they shut down ByLock and switched to other programs. Were MIT or the General Staff so naive that they never suspected anything until a major came knocking on MIT's door on the afternoon of July 15th?

Second Undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Hakan Fidan was targeted by the police and judicial wings of the Gülenist organization as early as February 2012, allegedly due to his alleged ties to the PKK. It became clear that the Gülenists' target was Erdoğan, via MIT. Despite this, why was Erdoğan praising Gülen and extending an invitation to the "Turkish Language Olympiad" in June 2012, encouraging him to "end this longing"?

3. In 2004, the General Staff warned the National Security Council (MGK) about the Gülenist organization within the state, and the former CHP leader stated that the "F-Type" structure had begun "taking over" the deep state starting in 2005. Despite this, why was the Telecommunications Communications Presidency (TİB), which was later revealed to have wiretapped all communications while transmitting state secrets verbatim to "an address in the US," and which was then shut down when it was understood that it had fallen completely into Gülenist hands, transferred in 2005 to the Ministry of Transportation under Binali Yıldırım, rather than to the MIT or the Interior Ministry? While the electronic surveillance powers of the General Staff and MIT were restricted and the TİB was expanded, was no consideration ever given to the consequences?

4. While Erdoğan was presented with the Ergenekon investigations launched after the 2007 presidential/e-memorandum as "purging secularists from the state" or "uncovering an assassination attempt on you," didn't he see that the Gülenists were actually purging those in the army, judiciary, universities, and civil society who could be a hindrance to them? Do AK Party officials really want us to believe that they are Anatolian children too naive and naive to see this?

5. In 2009, members of the Gülenist security and judicial branches entered the "Cosmic Room" at the Special Forces Command, where the state's most secret information was stored, on the pretext of an assassination attempt on Bülent Arınç. It remains unknown whether that information was sent to an address in the US. President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu were among them. How could they not have foreseen the consequences of this erasure of state secrets within their own administrations under the guise of civilianization?

6. Throughout this entire process, the ranks of the AK Party in Parliament and the government were increasingly filled with Fethullahists. I don't want to name names now and get into the legal fray. But even in the government that was in office after July 15th, it was openly discussed which ministers were Fethullahists, and who in Parliament and the party were Fethullahists. Why were the organization's political connections and members within the AK Party protected?

7. Why was the Parliamentary July 15th Investigation Commission prevented from uncovering the Gülenists' political connections? Why weren't Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar and MIT Undersecretary Fidan, who were in the most critical positions on the night of the coup attempt, asked to testify? While citizens who deposited bills at Bank Asya lost their jobs and perhaps their freedom because they were accused of being FETÖ members, why are AKP members, who once acted as the Gülenists' unofficial spokespeople, still around?

8. All right-wing politicians were involved in the founding of Bank Asya, but it was Erdoğan's AK Party government that granted Bank Asya near-public bank status. As if that weren't enough, the authority to organize the business side of official trips was taken from the Foreign Economic Relations Council (DEİK), which until then operated under the umbrella of TOBB, and given to TUSKON, which formed the financial and administrative structure of the Gülenist organization in over a hundred countries. While ordinary economic writers saw that the Gülenists were also trying to take over the Republic of Turkey's foreign trade network, did Erdoğan and his government fail to see it?

9. It was TUSKON that kept the Gülen schools, which the government at the time promoted as "Turkish Schools" but were actually based on American curricula, afloat. Using the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a tool, the government promoted these schools in front of all countries. Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first to oppose and close them in 2008, citing pro-US activities. Didn't Erdoğan see that these schools were becoming an alternative, parallel diplomatic focus abroad for the Turkish Foreign Ministry?

10. The reason for the resignation of Chief of General Staff Işık Koşaner and three force commanders at the end of July 2011 was, in fact, "We can no longer stop the Gülenists, you are preventing us from doing so, we don't want to be partners." In this outburst, interpreted as a throw-in, the commanders were waving their resignations like flags, warning of the impending danger. Indeed, six or seven months later, the attempt to arrest Fidan exploded. Was it the relief of the Kemalists in the army, believing they had finally been purged, that prevented the government from heeding this signal, or was it the commanders who had been granted early ranks and positions who had reassured the government, saying, "There's no problem, everything is under control"? In either case, wasn't the government gravely at fault?

11. The arrest of İlker Başbuğ in 2012, the subsequent attempted arrest of Fidan, the coincidence of this with the dialogue process with the PKK, the corruption allegations of December 17-25, the MIT Truck incident, and finally, the secret recording of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu's office during a secret Syria meeting in 2014—considered Türkiye's biggest espionage case to date—and the raid of the Mosul Consulate General by ISIS were all somehow linked to the Syrian civil war, the PKK, and the US. Indeed, both ties with the US and the dialogue process were severed when Barack Obama chose the PKK as a partner in Kobani in the fall of 2014. Did none of the strategic geniuses claiming to design the 21st century put two and two together and assess that the US would use every means at its disposal to bring the Turkish government into line?

12. President Erdoğan and his government believe the US is behind the Gülenist coup attempt. In fact, the purchase of S-400s from Russia is being considered, in a sense, as a precaution against the possibility of a new uprising. Has Erdoğan shared this belief, or rather, his suspicion, with US President Donald Trump, with whom he has emphasized (and clearly shares) a special closeness?

13. Does Erdoğan truly want Fethullah Gülen extradited to Türkiye? Or does he want Gülen to remain in the US, always holding him as leverage in US relations? I ask these questions in response to the claim that most of the documents the Americans consistently receive from Türkiye consist of press citations. I have no personal doubt that US authorities are specifically protecting Gülen; he is being specifically protected.

14. Following the coup attempt, Erdoğan first relegated parliamentary activities to the background, running the state without oversight through statutory decrees. Then, with the support of the MHP, he transitioned to a presidential system, rendering parliament dysfunctional and the judiciary semi-dependent on the executive branch. This process saw significant regressions in rights and freedoms. Does Erdoğan see the presidential system, a continuation of the statutory decree regime, as sustainable in its current form? Doesn't he see that the regime, enforced by his partner, MHP leader Bahçeli, is making Türkiye and his own power increasingly vulnerable?

15. The most significant side effect of July 15th was that Türkiye began to trust Russia more than the US and other Western allies. We are now exercising our sovereign rights to engage in military cooperation with Russia, on which we already depend for energy, tourism, and agricultural exports. In other words, Russia and Putin are among the biggest beneficiaries of July 15th, which was fortunately suppressed. My final question for now is this: How much, and to what extent, does Erdoğan trust Putin and Russia as allies?