What does Erdoğan want from Özel?

If there's anything hotter than the current climate, it's the current political agenda in Turkey. The tension generated by the government's offensive strategy is intensifying the political atmosphere daily. Erdoğan , who, risking the economic downturn, is applying limitless and excessive pressure on the opposition to stay afloat, is also seeking ways to "bring" CHP leader Özgür Özel into line, even as CHP mayors are being detained one by one. So, what does Erdoğan really want from Özel?

Before answering this question, it's important to understand why Erdoğan felt the need for Özel to put the brakes on. Erdoğan was at his strongest in terms of state control and weakest in terms of public support during his time in power. This balance acted like a seesaw for Erdoğan. Under conditions of public support, unlike today, he lacked the advantage of controlling the state. In fact, this very lack of control was what created his political legitimacy.

In his early days in power, Erdoğan claimed authority "against the elites governing the state" and was able to secure it from broad segments of society, particularly conservatives. However, as Erdoğan gradually became the state itself and began representing the center, the impact and credibility of this ideological discourse gradually diminished. In a sense, Erdoğan, the "man of the nation," lost out to Erdoğan, who had become "his state."

This defeat confined its mass approval to the narrowest possible framework, while the power envisioned by political Islamist thought materialized in a "personal state," which proved to be far from satisfactory. Furthermore, it confronted the reality that the so-called "nation" was not free from class contradictions. While conservatism created its own wealthy minority and elite culture, the vast majority at the bottom were left with the struggle for subsistence, poverty, and patriotic rhetoric.

RESOURCE SHORTAGE

Now, there's no longer a political narrative, no motivation to mobilize the masses. While he constantly capitalizes on the concern that "our headscarved sisters used to be unable to enter universities," some of the "headscarved sisters" he addresses are fighting for İmamoğlu's freedom at the CHP stands. The rest, however, don't sense such a current threat in the Turkey of 2025. The targeting of LeMan magazine is a prime example. If state police detain a cartoonist using excessive force and handcuffing him behind his back, and a state minister braggingly shares the footage, what more is left for his "fellow believers" to do? If one has already become a "state member," can one simultaneously become "oppressed and victimized" and organize a political reflex from this?

Political Islamism knew how to generate power through "victimhood"; once it achieved a dominant position, its ability to popularize politics atrophied. Because it had nothing more in store. This is the ideological crisis the Erdoğan government is experiencing today and will never overcome. The "security regime" it has constructed and the perception of a "strong state" it is attempting to create are only capable of producing a very limited response in the current conditions of years of wreckage and the people's financial hardship. This is why, for the first time in its history, the AKP is so timid about the ballot box, which the CHP has called for by calling for a "show of faith."

With this decline in power, the opposition has the wind at its back. The CHP has risen to the top position for the first time in half a century, and therefore for the first time in the AKP's years. Simulations of the presidential election also show CHP candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu receiving more votes than Erdoğan. Not only İmamoğlu but also Mansur Yavaş is outperforming Erdoğan. The regime's only response to this is to break the opposition's momentum with repression and sow internal turmoil within the CHP through various ongoing lawsuits and investigations.

However, in the current equation, there's one actor disrupting the government's plans: Özgür Özel, who uses the social opposition that spilled onto the streets on March 19th as a reference point in his political endeavors and raises the bar ever higher. The CHP leader has thwarted the government's expectations in two ways over the past four months. First, his performance following İmamoğlu's arrest has kept his party united. Second, his refusal to engage in politics within the government's established boundaries and his resolute pursuit of an immediate election to wrest power from the AKP.

Erdoğan doesn't want such a CHP against him. He knows he lacks the strength to compete democratically with a CHP and its candidates who have become massive and, in Özel's words, have captured the "energy of the majority." Naturally, İmamoğlu isn't the only problem, and Erdoğan's problem isn't solved by eliminating İmamoğlu. İmamoğlu has gained power because he was able to be the candidate representing the will for change. If the CHP leadership is to remain at the center of the broad opposition and continue to embrace the will for change, can blocking a single candidate extinguish the demand for change among millions? Of course not, and that's precisely why Erdoğan is trying to force the CHP to surrender. To this end, he's using his only trump card: state power. Contrary to popular belief, Erdoğan isn't so concerned with whether his own base or society at large is convinced by the operations; he's more concerned with whether he holds power.

NEW ORDER AND CHP

The permanence of regime change depends on the CHP engaging in politics within an area defined by Erdoğan, during a time when the Kurdish movement is relatively under control through the "process." The AKP-MHP alliance expects the CHP to remain loyal to its role as the "main opposition" and become a key pillar of the new order being established. This order involves no demand for a change of government, no strong opposition, and no democracy in the traditional sense. There is an "internal front" united around Erdoğan's leadership.

Erdoğan, who urged Özgür Özel to "engage in Ankara-centric politics," is essentially trying to dissuade the CHP from pursuing a government. The congress case, postponed until September, is nothing more than a response to the CHP's claim of "changing the government," a "Then we'll change the CHP," and a threat to hand the party over to a cadre that has been granted "approved opposition" status. This may not be a de facto, but rather a political, "shutdown of the CHP." Özgür Özel's opposition stance and recent statements demonstrate that he understands the regime's intentions.

This is far more than a CHP issue or the Erdoğan-İmamoğlu rivalry. It should not be forgotten for a second that the country is passing through a critical phase, one in which concerns remain over whether the tradition of freely electoral transfer of power will continue. The united resistance displayed against the establishment's attempt to subjugate the opposition will determine the fate of the Republic.