Targets in the Fog: Russia's War and the Search for Justification
On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in his speech at the start of the war that the goal of the “special military operation” was the “demilitarization and denazification” of Ukraine and the protection of the people of Donbass from genocide.
In January 2023, he stressed that the goals were of a "fundamental nature." Two years later, in January 2025, Putin said the goal was to secure the interests of the Russian people. "We will fight for the interests of Russia and the Russian people. That is the real meaning and purpose of the special military operation," he said in a Telegram video.
Three years after the start of the war, the central question remains unanswered: Why are thousands dying on both sides? According to political scientist Yekaterina Schulmann, this ambiguity is deliberate. "The autocratic regime in Russia is keeping as many grey areas open as possible in order to sell every outcome as a success. First they invent terms like 'demilitarization', and later they can be interpreted as they wish - or not. The power elite is neither accountable to its citizens nor bound by public obligations, which explains the vague war rhetoric."
The ideological vacuum is so obvious that the brightest minds in the Putin regime are looking for a justification for the war - often with contradictory narratives. For example, philosopher Alexander Dugin, often referred to in the West as Putin's "spiritual mentor" or "personal ideologist" (although there is no evidence for this), described the "military special operation" as the "holy struggle of Orthodox Russia against the hordes of the Antichrist" and the "satanic West" as early as 2022.
In Dugin's view, the "special operation" represents the return of the empire and the restoration of Russia's "messianic, futuristic destiny". For him, there are only two options - "homeland or death". The head of the International Eurasian Movement calls for radical measures: mobilization and replacement of the "treacherous" elite. Then the great Russian people will win.
In his essay "Parade of Imperialisms", former Putin adviser and architect of the United Russia party, Vladislav Surkov, sees the "special operation" as an expression of Russian imperialism, which has already found imitators: the USA is claiming Canada, Greenland and the Panama Canal , Israel is expanding towards Syria, and China is gently paving its "Silk Roads" across all continents. Surkov describes Russia as the "leading nation of Eurasia" that is successfully reviving the idea of empire. At the same time, he compares the war to the "window to Europe" that Tsar Peter the Great once opened to strengthen Russia's influence towards the West.
With Trump, the “fight against Western values” loses importanceOne can only guess which of these narratives is closer to the Kremlin. Political scientist Abbas Galljamov believes that the different interpretations indicate an ideological disorientation in the upper echelons of power. There is no unified line from above, so that ideologues close to the regime have to improvise. The ideological crisis has even worsened after Trump's election victory: "The war is portrayed as a fight against the West, which is destroying traditional values. But now that America is 'on the right path' from the Russian perspective, this ideology is losing relevance," said Galljamov, who has been declared a foreign agent in Russia.
Does the idea of a Russian empire, which Dugin and Surkov talk about - albeit in different ways - resonate in Russian hearts? The crucial question is what price the Russians are prepared to pay for it, says Galljamov: "When it comes to waving a flag and shouting 'Crimea is ours!' everyone is happy to be an imperialist. But as soon as it comes to fighting for it, the ranks thin out noticeably."
Even the so-called turbo-patriots, who fervently support the war, cannot name any clear goals. However, the idea of restoring an empire is close to their hearts, says writer Ivan Fillipov, who monitors the patriotic Telegram channels. But while Surkov ponders the expansion of the borders to the West, the hurrah-patriots ask: How is this supposed to happen?
"The army is suffering from an acute shortage of personnel, despite rising salaries. However, Vladimir Putin refuses to order mobilization. A million additional soldiers would be needed just to take Kharkiv - an estimate by military bloggers, not mine," explains Fillipov, whose dystopian novel "The Mouse" was banned in Russia.
The hurrah-patriots are outdoing each other with interpretations of the war aims: "Some claim that it is a preventive war because NATO wanted to attack Russia via Ukraine. It is therefore a matter of national security. Others are of the opinion that Ukraine must be destroyed because it is actually a part of Russia and there is no Ukrainian people. Still others dream of rebuilding the Soviet Union and want to target Kazakhstan or the Baltic states after Ukraine," says Fillipov.
While philosophers and patriots ponder the aims of the war, there is a remarkable indifference in Russian society. "People in Russia want to know absolutely nothing about this war. They act as if it doesn't exist - and they succeed surprisingly well," says Fillipow.
Jekaterina Schulmann sees this conscious turning away as a form of self-protection. Thinking about the meaning of the war leads to nothing but emotional pain: "If a Russian asks himself this question - what then? What should he do with this knowledge? Arrange a self-immolation in a central city square?"
The Kremlin has long since recognized that the war has little support among the population and has therefore refrained from large-scale mobilization. Instead, it is largely leaving the people alone. Ultra-patriots are already making fun of this strategy and calling it "Sleep, you great country" - a sarcastic allusion to the song "Stand up, you great country", which in 1941 called on Soviet citizens to resist Hitler's troops. Political scientist Schulmann does not see this strategy as a weakness, but rather as a conscious decision by the Russian leadership.
An autocracy like the Russian one does not need popular mobilization, because the war is fought "with a mixture of coercion and bribery." Clear war aims are therefore not only unnecessary, but even a hindrance. "You can hardly get people excited about the 'demilitarization' of another country with 'Stand up, you great country,'" says Schulmann, who had to leave Russia and now lives in Berlin.
Ultra-patriots like the writer Zakhar Prilepin are already saying openly that any result can be considered a victory. Russia cannot lose the war against Ukraine, Prilepin recently explained, because no specific goals have been set. Wherever the army stops, the war will end, said Prilepin. The decision about when to start and when to end rests solely with the leadership, he added: "Nobody asked us when the war started, and nobody will ask us when it will end."
But Schulmann warns that as soon as the hostilities are over, the mood in the country will change. "In a situation full of uncertainty and danger to life, no one asks why. But after the war, after the initial relief that everything is over, the question will inevitably arise: what was that really?" This moment could be dangerous for the Russian political system - and the Kremlin is already preparing for it.
Berliner-zeitung
