TV review “Hart aber fair”: Unstoppable into the new grand coalition

Brexit, Trump, the 2021 state election in Saxony-Anhalt: Because pollsters have been wrong several times recently, there is now some surprise among all parties that the federal election turned out largely as predicted for weeks. With the exception of the Left, all parties had hoped for a little more than the polls suggested (some even a good bit more), a bonus that has now shamelessly failed to materialize. Amazingly, however, the result is as clear and simple as has rarely happened before.

Even if the new edition of “Hart aber fair” asks who will change Germany now – the topic of the show was already decided before the election – it seems pretty clear which coalition that will have to be; the only question is what the trimmed SPD will negotiate with the CDU, which is no longer quite as forceful. One day after the election, at a time when there is great uproar in the Greens and the FDP because the generals are deserting the flag in a huff, the teaser for the “Hart aber fair” show continues to ask: “Are the Greens a possible partner?” (No!) And: “Will the FDP be thrown out of the Bundestag?” (Yes!) This could be followed by the question: is anyone working in this editorial office the day after the election? One would have expected that the teaser for the big Monday talk show would have been adapted to the new political realities at some point before the show.

The right thing to do was not to invite the overtired fighters from the front row again, who have been seen on all channels for weeks and who had also been interviewed in the “ARD Brennpunkt” – in a pleasingly sharp interview by Markus Preiß. It was enlightening that both CDU puppet master Thorsten Frei (who many believe will be the next Chancellor’s Office Minister) and CSU Sun King Markus Söder appealed to the SPD’s responsibility in that “Brennpunkt” to join Friedrich Merz ’s government without any major fuss. Söder spoke of the “last bullet of democracy”. SPD party chairman Lars Klingbeil admitted responsibility in an interesting formulation (“we are aware of the responsibility”), but at the same time made it clear that the decision for the coalition had its price.

Four politicians were now sitting with Louis Klamroth who would have had the chance to talk on a different, more collegial or at least more technical level. Nothing came of it. The fatal impression was that even in the second row, German politicians are now so walled in by their respective fortresses of party positions and language rules that no longer appear negotiable that one could be worried about their ability to form a coalition per se. When the representatives of the CDU and SPD were at loggerheads again, the FDP representative commented with a sharp tongue: "I wish you happy coalition negotiations."

It all began with a lot of ducking and diving. Wolfgang Schmidt ( SPD ), head of the Federal Chancellery and one of Olaf Scholz's closest confidants, did not want to attribute the SPD's poor performance to the current Chancellor's lack of popularity, but to the mood of the times. "All over Europe" governments had been voted out. "The crisis" in the wake of the war in Ukraine was to blame; the citizens' dissatisfaction was then dumped on the head of government. When asked whether Boris Pistorius would not have been twice the better candidate, Schmidt said in all seriousness: "This review (...) may be interesting for talk shows, but I don't think it's quite as exciting for the country. And it's usually not that useful for a party to engage in such navel-gazing."

A plea for not dealing with the past, which Philipp Amthor (CDU) even agreed with, but only to immediately expect Olaf Scholz to accommodate the chancellor-in-waiting, Friedrich Merz. As far as the CDU's performance in the election is concerned, Amthor admitted that they would of course have been pleased with more than 30 percent, but even so the election victory was a great "comeback": after the CDU was voted out of office three years ago, it was predicted that it would have to spend many years in opposition. A very convoluted argument. And Amthor did not comment on the fact that the dissatisfaction at the time was conflated with the word "Groko" and that they now intend to rejoin this coalition.

The excuses were even more vague when Andreas Audretsch, the campaign manager and deputy parliamentary group leader of the Greens, was asked whether it was the candidate or the campaign that was at fault. "We came from a very difficult context, from a very contentious coalition," said Audretsch. They then "fought their way up" from 10 percent approval (to 11.6 percent). They even experienced "huge momentum", received 12 million euros in donations from over a hundred thousand people, and recruited over 42,000 new members. Denial of reality here too. The badly failed attempt to take the chancellery is being spun out as a small success story; perhaps a last twitch of Robert Habeck's "confidence" mantra.

Only Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (FDP) did not sugarcoat anything, because there is little that can be sugarcoated when the party fails to clear the five percent hurdle. She also looks at local politics from a distance - from the European Parliament. She did not want to reveal whether she is aiming to succeed Christian Lindner as party leader, but predicted difficult times for her party: "The interest in voting for a party that is no longer relevant will very quickly disappear."

With so little willingness to engage in genuine self-criticism, it is hardly surprising that the credible concern shared by all those present in view of the massive increase in approval ratings for the AfD, which is in parts right-wing extremist, did not lead to an honest discussion about what the centrist parties had done wrong - but rather straight back to the election campaign. Wolfgang Schmidt's not very in-depth analysis that the AfD was voted for by both protest voters and actual right-wing extremists was not made much more complex by Amthor's addition that "completely normal people from the middle of society" also voted for the Blues. That is why the CDU does not want to build a firewall against AfD voters, while the party's officials represent the political opponents.

Very quickly, the discussion turned to the "breaking of taboos" of the two votes in which the CDU had relied on the votes of the AfD. The accusations and justifications that had been heard so often were brought up again in agitation. Audretsch said that his trust had really been destroyed: "That was always the basic rule: never with the right-wing extremists." Philipp Amthor rejected the "anti-fascist tutoring" and stubbornly claimed that the votes had not been initiated for party tactical reasons. In doing so, the CDU had ultimately only strengthened the Left and the AfD, countered Schmidt. According to Amthor, the successfully adopted motion for a resolution ("a better press release" Schmidt called it), the so-called "five-point plan", was by no means worthless just because Friedrich Merz had admitted that not all those who were required to leave the country could be taken into custody immediately, as was provided for in point 4. But Amthor did not seem to want to fight for the five-point plan entirely. It may already be largely worthless.

The fact that a little agreement arose again among the guests was due, of all things, to the objections of the journalist Gilda Sahebi, who clearly wanted to make an important distinction - migration should not be spoken of as a general problem: that would only serve the AfD narrative - but who did so in such an undifferentiated and clumsy way that everyone protested against her accusations. In fact, it seemed more silly than provocative when Sahebi said of the CDU: "The way they want to do politics is, of course, to give even more to the people who already have a lot." When Amthor interjected, "you don't just have to read 'taz'," she completely lost the thread and stammered her way into a Merz-Trump parallel that was no longer really easy to follow.

Slightly embarrassed by the level of debate, the politicians then took a step back. Things got heated again when the question arose as to whether Friedrich Merz would stick to his promise to deliver Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, as Strack-Zimmermann demanded very directly – this time on the issue close to her heart. In response to Schmidt’s hesitation on this issue (“it’s not a game changer”; “the world has changed again since then”), who did not want to speak of a red line but seemed less than enthusiastic about the idea, Strack-Zimmermann railed with desirable clarity: “Yes, Germany has done the most, but it is not enough. And if the Americans withdraw, it is in our interest that we do it.” This is particularly important now, “because Ukraine is about to really collapse.”

What was not discussed was also interesting. Although Olaf Scholz and Robert Habeck have been warning on a continuous loop in recent weeks that Friedrich Merz could no longer be trusted after his "breach of promise", no one here - as previously in "Brennpunkt" - assumed that there could actually be coalition negotiations or other agreements between the CDU and the AfD, not even to put the SPD under tactical pressure. Looking back, this also made it clear how hypocritical and populist the election campaign was on all sides. A little more decency and dignity in communication would probably have been a great achievement.

If this edition of "Hart aber fair" had only consisted of what we have seen so far, it would have been largely dispensable, because in all these exchanges of speeches, one could not go beyond often heard, rehearsed and clearly differentiated party-political phrases and clichés. Moderator Louis Klamroth also did not do the best job of breaking up these almost automated debates. But then, somewhat surprisingly, there was a game changer in terms of talk show sexiness towards the end. It was about a very current, even acute issue: Friedrich Merz's emerging willingness to reconsider the reform of the debt brake, which was wordily ruled out during the election campaign . And perhaps even at a rapid pace, in order to initiate such a reform or a special fund for Ukraine aid with the factions of the old Bundestag - where the centrist parties would have a two-thirds majority. In the new Bundestag, the AfD and the Left could prevent this change or the establishment of such a fund.

The SPD had always advocated taking on such debt. The old Bundestag convening for this purpose was one possibility, said Schmidt. Now the CDU - here in the form of Philipp Amthor - also no longer seems to have a problem with this, not even with the turbo variant: "The Bundestag is still in office for four weeks." The MPs are not paid to pack boxes. In addition, the interim Bundestag has already convened before the new one is constituted in an emergency (he was referring to the decision of the 13th Bundestag in October 1998 on German participation in NATO air operations in the Kosovo conflict). Of course, it is not about financing "free beer for everyone" through debt. Therefore, the request is consistent with what Merz had previously promised.

However, Audretsch enjoyed the fact that there is a striking contradiction and that "it took exactly one day" for this resolute change to take place: "It was so clear that this is exactly what would happen." Things then got exciting when Audretsch was asked whether the Greens, who otherwise currently have no major options for action, would play along in such a vote. The strategist immediately switched to bazaar mode: "What is not possible is for us to pick one point and ignore everything else." A special Bundeswehr fund could therefore be created with the Greens, "but of course there has to be some concessions," i.e. only if money is also raised for infrastructure, cybersecurity and other things. Positions can change so quickly. Politicians in the center can need each other so quickly, compromises and deals can be forged. And talk shows can be that close to real, concrete day-to-day politics here and there.