DATA ANALYSIS - How Germany has changed since the refugee crisis in 2015 – an overview in 15 graphics

“We can do it” – with this sentence, Angela Merkel justified her decision in August 2015 to allow hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers and war refugees to enter the country.

But has Germany really succeeded? The NZZ presents 15 charts illustrating the consequences of the 2015/16 refugee crisis for the labor market, domestic security, public finances, and demographics.

Rarely has Germany's population structure changed so dramatically in such a short period of time. 490,000 of the migrants who came to Germany in 2015 and 2016 alone were Syrians – generally asylum seekers – along with 161,000 Afghans, 133,000 Iraqis, and more than 200,000 people of unclear nationality. In addition, according to official statistics, around 1.6 million people immigrated from EU countries, primarily from Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.

In total, 4 million people immigrated in just two years, of which more than 1.2 million applied for asylum .

The record years of 2015/16 were surpassed only by 2022 and 2023, when 4.6 million people immigrated, including around 1.4 million Ukrainians. Balancing arrivals and departures, the year 2022 saw an increase of almost 1.5 million people – the highest net immigration in the past seventy years.

The reason: In addition to the refugee movements from Ukraine and the permanently high influx from Romania, Poland and Bulgaria , the number of asylum applications also increased again from 2022 , especially from Syria and Turkey.

The following graphic shows why many Germans will likely remember the years 2015/16 as more dramatic than the refugee movements following the outbreak of the Ukraine war. Before 2015, migration to Germany was primarily European: Starting in the late 1950s, guest workers initially immigrated from Italy, Spain, and Greece, later from Turkey. After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, Poles, Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians increasingly arrived. Starting in 2014, the picture shifted fundamentally for the first time – immigration from countries outside Europe steadily increased.

Although most migrants in 2015/16 still came from Europe, many Europeans – including many Germans – left again; on balance, European nationalities accounted for only just under a third. Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq alone accounted for 40 percent of net immigration. There were also larger migration movements from Eritrea, Iran, Pakistan, and Nigeria.

Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis continued to dominate asylum migration in Germany for many years . This is also reflected in migration statistics: in 2024, there were still around 100,000 arrivals of people with Syrian passports.

Some of the people who applied for asylum in 2015/16 have now been naturalized: Since 2020, around 300,000 Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis have received German passports – two-thirds of them in 2023 and 2024 alone. With the "turbo naturalization" program, the traffic light coalition shortened the deadlines in individual cases to just three years.

At the same time, the proportion of foreigners in Germany's population continued to rise, reaching a new record of almost 15 percent in 2024. At the same time, one in three people in West Germany had a migration background, while in East Germany, it was one in nine.

A historical comparison of the five most common foreign nationalities demonstrates how dramatically the composition of the population has changed. While in 2014, Turks, Poles, and Italians dominated the German rankings—in East Germany, some of them were still former contract workers from Vietnam—the ratios have since shifted.

In 2024, people with Turkish passports will continue to represent the largest group, but Ukrainians (1.3 million) will already be in second place, ahead of Syrians (975,000). The number of Romanians has also nearly tripled in ten years.

People with Syrian passports now make up the majority of the foreign population in many major cities—for example, in Essen, Bochum, Bonn, Kiel, Regensburg, and Magdeburg. Even in rural regions, especially in the northeast, they are often among the three most important foreign groups—as the following interactive map shows.

Angela Merkel’s expectation, expressed in 2016, that Syrians would “ return to their homeland ” after the end of the war with the knowledge they acquired in Germany, has not yet been fulfilled.

Between 2014 and 2024, approximately 1.06 million Syrians immigrated, while fewer than 170,000 left the country. More recent data from the Federal Statistical Office for the months following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 are not yet available. However, according to a media report , only around 4,000 Syrians returned to their homeland in the first half of 2025. Some are likely to remain in the country permanently anyway—as demonstrated by the sharp increase in naturalizations since 2020.

The large influx of asylum seekers, war refugees, and other people seeking protection has not been without consequences for German citizens' sense of security. In a representative survey conducted last year by R+V Insurance on Germans' fears, 56 percent of respondents said they feared the high number of refugees would overwhelm the state. Fifty-one percent said they feared tensions caused by the influx of foreigners.

In fact, the number of so-called violent and crimes against freedom increased significantly in 2016. According to the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), two-thirds of the cases involved bodily harm, along with robbery, coercion, threats, and deprivation of liberty. According to BKA figures, the increase is largely attributable to "immigrants." The BKA defines these as asylum seekers and other persons entitled to protection, tolerated persons, and people with illegal residence .

In the years that followed, the number of violent crimes initially declined. Since 2022, it has been rising again. The Federal Criminal Police Office attributes this to the end of the coronavirus lockdowns. This has led to more foreigners returning to Germany. Furthermore, more people are moving around in public spaces again, creating additional opportunities for crime.

Immigrants are significantly overrepresented in numerous crimes. According to the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), they accounted for approximately 12 percent of suspects in sexual offenses in 2017. Furthermore, at least one immigrant suspect was involved in 12 percent of solved cases. At the same time, their share of the total population—excluding people with illegal residence —was only 2 percent.

The number of violent crimes and crimes against freedom committed by immigrants has remained high since the 2015/16 refugee wave. In 2024, they were responsible for one-tenth of these crimes and 8 percent of all sexual offenses.

There are significant differences between immigrants depending on their nationality. Looking at general crime, excluding immigration law violations, Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis account for the largest proportion of suspected immigrants. However, relative to their high proportion of refugees, Syrians and Iraqis are slightly underrepresented, and Ukrainians are significantly underrepresented.

The situation is different for immigrants from the Maghreb states. Although Algerians accounted for only 0.2 percent of asylum seekers in 2023, they accounted for 3.6 percent of immigrants suspected of committing crimes—about 18 times their share.

The difference is striking for Ukrainians: Although they constituted by far the largest proportion of refugees in 2023, their share among suspected immigrants was comparatively low at just under 12 percent. One reason for this is likely the gender structure: Most adult war refugees from Ukraine are women. The situation was different for asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan in 2015/16: Back then, around two-thirds were male and the majority were younger than 30 – a group that statistically commits more crimes.

A lack of prospects may also play a role among immigrants from the Maghreb states – this is the conclusion reached by the authors of a criminological study on refugee crime. It states that refugees from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco – unlike those from Syria – "face a massive disappointment soon after their arrival in Germany: They have neither a right of residence nor a work permit."

However, there are other reasons why some nationalities are statistically conspicuous. In addition to low levels of education, poverty, and experiences of violence, researchers also point to culturally influenced " masculinity norms that legitimize violence ." A report commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs concludes that young male migrants from Muslim countries of origin have internalized such norms significantly more often than Germans of the same age.

Today's refugees would be the "skilled workers of tomorrow" – alongside Merkel's "We can do it," this was the second central phrase of Germany's "welcoming culture." Andrea Nahles (SPD), then Federal Minister of Labor, was one of the first to utter it at the height of the refugee crisis in September 2015. Dieter Zetsche, CEO of Daimler at the time, was also certain : "These are precisely the kind of people we're looking for at Mercedes and throughout our country." They might even be able to "lay the foundation for the next German economic miracle," Zetsche said.

The reality was different. Nine months later, the DAX-listed company had hired just nine refugees on permanent contracts . A survey by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) shows why: While most asylum seekers who arrived between 2013 and 2016 had attended school, only 58 percent had completed their studies. Only 16 percent had university or professional qualifications from abroad—a problem in a labor market like Germany, which is heavily focused on certificates.

Six years later, almost a quarter had begun an apprenticeship or university course in Germany. Whether these courses were successfully completed remains unclear—no figures are yet available.

The situation is similarly challenging for children of migrants. They need significantly more support, especially in the first generation. Since the large influx from countries like Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, their average performance has deteriorated noticeably .

In 2011, the gap compared to children without a migration background in mathematics was 55 points; by 2021, it had already reached 87 points – roughly equivalent to a gap of one year of learning. In reading skills, migrant children fell even further behind: in 2021, the gap was approximately 1.7 years of learning.

By 2025, the situation in schools had further deteriorated – this is the finding of the latest Education Monitor from the German Economic Institute (IW). Until 2015, the system had been continuously improving , but since then, the quality of German schools has been declining. The main cause is the overburdening caused by the high influx of refugees, according to the report, which was made available to "Die Welt" in advance.

Asylum migration also left a deep mark on the labor market, as shown by figures from the Federal Employment Agency. In 2016, for example, only 7 percent of Syrians had a job at one point; at the same time, almost 85 percent of employable Syrians received citizen's allowance. A similar pattern later emerged among Ukrainians, who – unlike Syrians – were entitled to citizen's allowance immediately upon their arrival.

In May 2025, the employment rate of people with Syrian passports was 44 percent—higher than in the years before the asylum crisis. For people from major asylum countries, it was slightly higher at just under 48 percent.

However, the development of the employment rate among those who have only arrived in the country since the refugee crisis cannot be determined from official figures alone. To clarify this question, the IAB, together with partner organizations, surveyed asylum seekers who came to Germany between 2013 and 2016 over several years.

The head of the relevant research department, Herbert Brücker, assumed that their employment rate – similar to that of refugees from the former Yugoslavia – would settle at around 50 percent in the medium term. "In fact, our expectations from back then have been exceeded. This applies both to the employment rate and to the proportion of skilled workers in the workforce," says Brücker.

Nine years after arrival, the employment rate is around 64 percent. Ninety percent of these are employed in jobs subject to social insurance contributions. This means that the asylum seekers of that time now have a higher employment rate than the average for foreigners overall. In this group, the rate was recently below 60 percent. However, the gender gap is significant: While 76 percent of male refugees are employed, the figure for women is only 35 percent.

According to the IAB, more than half are now considered skilled workers. However, the earnings of full-time refugees are only slightly above the low-wage threshold of 66 percent of the median wage level. The good news: According to calculations by the IW, the additional asylum migrants who have arrived since 2015 have contributed a total of around €240 billion to value added in Germany.

Although many asylum seekers have found work in Germany in recent years and are therefore no longer dependent on state support, the question remains whether they will be a financial burden or relief for the state over their life cycle. Employed migrants contribute to state funding through taxes and social security contributions. But they also make use of state benefits, such as health care and pensions.

Economists have come to different conclusions when calculating the financial consequences of immigration. In a study for the Market Economy Foundation, Freiburg-based economist Bernd Raffelhüschen examined the consequences of immigration for the revenues and expenditures of local governments and social security systems, taking into account the different qualification structures of migrants.

Raffelhüschen uses the development of visible (explicit) and invisible (implicit) government debt as a benchmark. The latter results from the benefits promised by the government and social security contributions that only become due in the future, such as pensions. Raffelhüschen calculates the sustainability gap from the ratio of explicit and implicit government debt to economic output.

This is lowest when there is no further immigration to Germany. The sustainability gap then amounts to 347 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

However, if immigration continues at the current rate, given the volume and qualifications of the migrants, a sustainability gap of approximately 497 percent of GDP will arise. This corresponds to €21.4 trillion. Compared to the scenario without immigration, this represents an additional burden of €6.5 trillion.

According to Raffelhüschen's calculations, immigration would have negative financial consequences for public budgets even if half of the migrants had vocational training or a university degree and, after just five years, paid the same amount of taxes and social security contributions as highly qualified nationals. In this case, he calculates a sustainability gap of approximately 433 percent of GDP.

Immigration would only be a financial gain for public budgets if it were possible to bring exclusively highly qualified people to Germany who would work from day one and pay taxes and social security contributions.

Martin Werding, a member of the German Council of Economic Experts, comes to a different conclusion. In a study for the Media Service for Integration, a project funded by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and supported by the Federal Government's Commissioner for Migration and Refugees, Werding concludes that immigration has a positive impact on the national budget. If 200,000 more people came to Germany each year, the state would save around 104 billion euros per year in the long run.

The reason for this, according to Werding, is that more employees drive stronger economic growth. This, in turn, generates additional revenue for the state in the form of taxes and social security contributions. "Overall, migration eases the burden on public budgets," says Werding.

However, the extent of the growth effects depends on how productively the migrants work and how high their earned income is.

The question of whether they burden or relieve the state budget depends not least on the age at which they begin paying taxes and social security contributions, and when they retire. This, in turn, is determined by the structure of the welfare state. Currently, foreigners pay less into the state budget and social security contributions during their working lives than Germans due to their lower incomes. However, they also claim fewer benefits in old age.

The central problem is that the state is not financially sustainable. It provides citizens with more benefits than they can afford over their lifetime. Because people are living longer, they are receiving pensions for longer and are making greater use of state benefits for care and healthcare. This applies to both Germans and foreigners.

"The welfare state, in its current form, is unaffordable in the long term for both the population living in Germany and immigrants," warns Raffelhüschen. Even a successful migration policy is therefore "no substitute for adjusting state benefits, particularly with regard to age-specific social spending."

When Angela Merkel opened the borders ten years ago, the refugees were enthusiastically welcomed by parts of the population. When the magnitude of the social, political, and economic challenges posed by the influx of refugees became clear, skepticism grew.

Ten years later, it can be said that Germany has achieved quite a bit. For example, the refugees who arrived from 2015 onwards have been comparatively well integrated into the labor market. However, the challenges remain significant. This applies to domestic security as well as the necessary restructuring of the welfare state.

Collaboration: Olivia Meyer (illustrations), Franco Gervasi (map)