What if Russia attacked Germany with missiles?

These are drones with cameras that have been appearing repeatedly for months over industrial facilities, wind farms, barracks, and ports in Germany. They come, film, and disappear again. It is suspected that they are sent by Russian intelligence services. The authorities can do little to stop them. Fortunately, these drones have not dropped bombs or exploded into a target, as has happened thousands of times in Ukraine.

But drones represent the last air threat to Germany. The worst-case scenario would be different. It would involve Russia no longer attacking Ukraine alone, but also targets in Germany – with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons.

A Russian attack on a key NATO member state? An unlikely scenario? Alarmism? Looking at Russia, not really. When Chancellor Friedrich Merz recently mentioned a possible delivery of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, the government in Moscow threatened to treat Germany as a party to the war as a consequence. The editor-in-chief of the propaganda channel RT, Margarita Simonyan, even claimed that "Moscow offices" were discussing bombing Berlin if the cruise missiles were delivered.

It's also important to know what Western think tanks , NATO, and the alliance's capitals think about the threat of a Russian attack. An attack in the Baltics, an invasion of Finland , a confrontation between Russia and NATO in the Baltic Sea—all of this, they say, can no longer be ruled out. On the contrary, it's becoming increasingly likely, and likely within the next few years.

In all cases, Germany would be in focus: as a NATO deployment area for reinforcements from overseas and as a hub for material and troop transfers from Western and Southern Europe. Germany is a country of strategic importance to NATO. A massive, coordinated air strike on key points could massively weaken the Alliance's defenses and severely impact Germany.

This raises questions: Could Germany protect its cities, its industry, its energy supply, and its strategic assets? And: Who decides what will be defended in an emergency—and what won't?

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the US's leading military intelligence agency, published data in May detailing the number and types of missiles, cruise missiles, and other weapons of this type that Russia possesses. According to this information, Vladimir Putin's army currently possesses over 350 nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles, each capable of carrying ten multiple warheads with an explosive yield of 800 kilotons. This corresponds to the explosive yield of 800,000 tons of TNT. By comparison, the Hiroshima bomb had an explosive yield of 15,000 tons of TNT. Russia, it further states, intends to increase the number of its intercontinental ballistic missiles to 400 by 2035.

In addition, there are 192 ballistic missiles stationed on submarines, 200 to 300 hypersonic weapons (by 2035: 1000) and 300 to 600 cruise missiles (by 2035: 5000).

Even assuming that the intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles remain in their silos, Russia already possesses, and will continue to possess, enormous capabilities for large-scale air strikes. Hundreds of short-range Iskander-M missiles are believed to be stationed in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad alone. With a range of more than 500 kilometers, they could also hit parts of northeastern Germany, possibly even Berlin.

In addition, there are cruise missiles such as Kalibr and Kh-101, which fly at ranges of 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers. Launched from aircraft, submarines, or ships, they are difficult to engage due to their flat trajectories. Germany offers countless targets for weapons like these.

The Federal Republic alone has 80 major cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, numerous air force bases, including the US Air Base in Ramstein, ports such as those in Hamburg, Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, Wilhelmshaven, Kiel and Rostock, refineries, transformer stations, data centers - the entire ABC of a nation that is one of the world's leading industrialized countries.

Germany is an ideal target for a coordinated missile attack. This was already the case during the Cold War and was the daily bread and butter of defense planning officials in the then West German capital of Bonn, at NATO's Operational Headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and in Washington. And today?

Germany's vulnerability is systemic. The country is highly industrialized, densely populated—and so far protected only sporadically. The entire republic would be within range of Russian missiles and cruise missiles. Government facilities, military infrastructure, industrial centers, energy and data networks, logistics hubs, and port facilities—from the North Sea coast to Lake Constance, from Görlitz to Aachen, there would be no safe space.

Today, technological developments in missiles have advanced to the point where it's enough to station a submarine in the Atlantic, a bomber in the Caspian Sea, or a truck with launch pads, a command post, and radar in Belarus to attack key German facilities. Germany's geographical depth, i.e., its size, is worthless the moment the technical protection measures are insufficient.

There's an old military saying: "Hit the bow, don't fight the arrow." One shouldn't fight the missile, but the place it comes from. In a figurative sense, this means that, in an emergency, Germany would be better off destroying the launch pads, radars, and depots from which Russia fires its missiles. But Germany currently has hardly any of the right weapons for this. They are only scheduled to be stationed in Germany by the USA in the coming years.

Currently, only the Taurus is available for such attacks. However, this cruise missile only has a range of 500 kilometers. In the future, the F-35 fighter jet, equipped with the Joint Strike Missile, could also be used for attacks on Russian launch bases. This is also a cruise missile that can fly up to 350 kilometers. The German Army is also said to be considering purchasing a ground-launched cruise missile. However, the F-35 and Army cruise missiles are a long way off. Their procurement will take time.

Therefore, Germany must rely primarily on its air defense. While modern, the number of systems is small, their availability limited, and their geographical impact restricted.

There's the Patriot system, which is well-suited to combating aircraft, tactical missiles, and cruise missiles at medium range. It's demonstrated this in Ukraine. However, the Bundeswehr currently only has nine systems, as it transferred three to Ukraine. That might be enough for the defense of Berlin. Eight more Patriots have been ordered and are expected to be delivered by the end of the decade.

A Patriot system (range: 70 km, altitude: 24 km) consists of several launchers, a radar, a fire control center, and the guided missiles. The other modern German air defense systems, Iris-T and Arrow, are composed of a similar number of components.

The Iris-T (range: 40 km, altitude: 20 km) has been proving its worth in Ukraine for two and a half years in defense against cruise missiles and rockets. Germany, however, possesses only a single system, which is not available to the military because it still needs to be tested by the procurement office. Five more Iris-T systems have been ordered, and the Air Force has stated that it would like to order six more.

While Iris-T is manufactured by a German company, Diehl, Germany is dependent on foreign suppliers for the Arrow system. Arrow is primarily intended for defense against long-range (nuclear-capable) ballistic weapons and hypersonic missiles. It is manufactured by the Israeli company Israel Air Industries. Individual components also come from the USA.

The first components of the Arrow system (range: up to 2,400 km, altitude: over 100 km) are scheduled to be assembled in Germany this year. According to the Air Force's plans, it should be fully operational by 2030. The Bundeswehr is also considering purchasing not only the Arrow-3 guided missile, but also the Arrow-4. While the Arrow-3 reaches into space, the Arrow-4 is intended to close the gap between the operational ranges of the Patriot and the Arrow-3.

This would give Germany missile defense at all altitudes, with Arrow as its core. In other words: Without Israel, the Federal Republic would be unable to defend itself against strategic missiles.

Air defense means prioritization. Ukraine uses its air defense systems primarily to protect major cities like Kyiv, Odessa, and Kharkiv. But what about Germany? Who decides whether Berlin or Munich would be defended?

It's not the Chancellor, not the Defense Minister, and not even the Bundeswehr. In the event of an attack on Germany, the NATO alliance would be triggered. Then, German air defense systems would be subordinate to the alliance and thus to its military commander-in-chief.

He's based in Belgium, not Berlin. Currently, that's US General Christopher Cavoli (starting this summer, US General Alexus Grynkewich). An attack on Germany would be an attack on NATO. Cavoli decides how to respond, i.e., what would be relevant and worth defending for the success of NATO warfare. Would that be major German cities and critical infrastructure, or rather important NATO military facilities? The answer to that question lies in NATO defense plans—and they're secret.

The advantage is that in an emergency, Germany would not be alone. NATO has an integrated early warning system, which includes satellites and radars. Other nations would contribute their defense systems. These include, for example, Dutch Patriot systems or American guided missile cruisers. The disadvantage is that Germany cannot decide anything on its own. If it wanted to, it would have to build a national air defense system in parallel with its alliance defense.

But anyone who needs interceptor missiles in an emergency must first own them – or have them delivered by someone. This is Germany's major structural weakness. It has ordered interceptor systems worth billions of dollars, and it has ordered hundreds of new guided missiles. But all of this takes time.

Air defense is a scarce resource worldwide, including within NATO. The current German governing parties, the CDU/CSU and SPD, have largely overseen the reduction of air defense over the past three decades. Now, time and capacity to address today's threats are scarce.

Modern air defense is expensive. A single Patriot missile costs approximately three to five million euros, and the price of an Arrow missile is significantly higher. Added to this are the complex, time-consuming manufacturing, logistics, and maintenance. Even a single night of a coordinated Russian attack like the one in Ukraine could likely cost Germany billions.

But if there is no alternative, then what Chancellor Friedrich Merz said about the modernization of the Bundeswehr applies: "Whatever it takes." In an industrialized and densely populated country like Germany, however, complete protection against missile attacks would be impossible even then.