What Europe do we want?

A European Parliamentarian stated during the period in which the new fiscal rules were being negotiated that, given the various proposals presented, the final outcome would always be the best and only possible. An agreement like this requires the agreement of the Commission, the unanimous agreement of the Council, and the European Parliament in the EU, each representing different ideological groups and, also, different national interests. Reaching a final agreement within these frameworks is not an easy task and, more than anything else, reflects the difficulties of European governance.

Can we ask the Commission to make a proposal, for example, like the tariff agreement with the US, that isn't endorsed by the states? It's impossible, although in this case the unanimity rule doesn't apply; it's determined by the double majority required (number of states and percentage of population). Ultimately, the EU is a political artifact without parallel in the world, but it doesn't politically achieve the same level of integration as a confederation. The EU's political weakness has become increasingly evident since the Trump administration came to power in the US. The results of the tariff pact are a testament to this; so is the weakness of the EU's political position on issues such as the Ukraine conflict or the war in Gaza compared to the protagonism of the US and Russia. Not to mention China, a major political factor that doesn't seem to be addressed with an organized economic and political response.

The challenge Addressing the EU's challenges requires greater sovereignty from European institutions and less from individual states.

If the diagnosis of Europe's political and economic situation has been made—there's no need to recall the contributions of the Letta and Draghi reports—why is there no action taken? An example of this is the proposal for a multiannual financial framework 2028-2034 recently presented by the Commission. In this case, the ambition that emerges is also very limited, especially in terms of scope.

As in many aspects of life, it is always possible to see the glass as half full or half empty, and it is true that, despite all its limitations, the EU has been able, first, to make people forget about European conflicts and, second, to manage the transition from the initial six members to the current 27—and, furthermore, the departure of the United Kingdom—without excessive setbacks and progressively reducing inequalities between the associated countries. It has also been able to provide responses, albeit somewhat inadequate, to the 2008 crisis and, more appropriately, to the impact of the pandemic. Without downplaying the EU's achievements, the question once again remains: what do we want Europe to be in the near future? And the best answer is that addressing the challenges facing the EU requires greater sovereignty for the European institutions, which is only possible by devolving it from the member states. Once again, a multi-speed Europe is on the table.