Kemal Can wrote: The unbearable inadequacy of politics

Türkiye's political arena has been experiencing extraordinary activity in recent years. 2023 and 2024 were already election years, and for three years, both before and after, extraordinary turmoil ensued. Türkiye's vote distribution maps shifted. 2025, however, became a year of processes. The "process" initiated by Bahçeli, the CHP blockade that began with the March 19 operations, and the intense external activity stretching from Syria to Gaza, Ukraine to Iran. With so much going on, talking about the stagnation and shallowness of politics might seem like an exaggerated joke. Unfortunately, in a period of such high activity, "politics," both at the institutional and intellectual levels, is experiencing its weakest and dullest times. The use of political capacity is languishing.

I wish the "production capacity" graph, one of the key economic indicators, were also calculated in terms of political capacity. Such a measurement would likely yield the lowest values ​​in the history of the multi-party era. Parties, aside from declaring positions on the current situation through their limited spokespeople—or even just their party leaders—and rhetoric (including rhetoric and generous threats) designed to alienate their core voters, are not particularly interested in political production. Not only is there no new production, but "goods" that have been in use for years are being put back on display—changing hands. Furthermore, these displays are outdated and the sales staff is extremely incompetent. Therefore, the adjective "political tradesmanship," which describes commerce conducted without producing anything, is quite relevant to the current landscape of institutional politics.

In the first decade of its rule, the AKP completely exhausted its narrative—in terms of its efforts to create politics. Instead of crafting a new narrative (politics) to maintain its grip on power, it resorted to easy paths like changing alliances and resorting to anti-political instruments. The culmination of this trajectory—prompted by its new alliance—was the Presidential System of Government. As was widely discussed before the constitutional referendum, it was clear that the inevitable outcome of this design would be the destruction of politics and a further shrinking of its reach, and the AKP was the one who suffered the greatest damage. First, the AKP was estranged from politics and disengaged; then, exhausted by the personalized politics of politics, Erdoğan abandoned politics and clung to power. The resulting crisis of inability to govern was overcome by exploiting them rather than establishing new rules.

Today, the AKP is pursuing a "survival project" built on thwarting its rivals, relying on state power, mobilizing all its instruments of power, especially the judiciary, to maintain its grip on power. This certainly has political consequences, and the power it wields offers political bargaining opportunities, but it's impossible to call this "making politics." Meanwhile, the increasingly widespread system of uncertainty and arbitrariness, coupled with the privileges of favor and punishment based on personal "legitimacy" both domestically and internationally, defines the limits of Erdoğan's "political role." This role, limited to influencing those who see themselves as winning and losing with him, has extremely limited political production capacity.

It's difficult to speak of the MHP producing politics outside its traditional sphere of representation, but Bahçeli's political role is increasingly being discussed. This is because, in 2002, 2007, 2015, 2017, and 2024, Bahçeli took critical steps that shifted the entire political balance, defining the positions of other political actors rather than his own. However, even if some still insist on justifying these interventions with simple political arithmetic, the "political motivation" of Bahçeli's political interventions is highly questionable. This is because most of these moves have very little connection to the political expectations and demands of the public—including the voters of the party he represents—while their characteristics of political design operations that cater to "other needs" are far more dominant.

There's no doubt that the process Bahçeli has driven, even turning into a personal mission independent of his party, is a crucial political move. However, from the outset, Bahçeli defined the issue as far outside of politics, even arguing that the solution lies in moving it beyond politics itself. He embodied the priority of the state's survival and Türkiye's place in the new world (the region) by banning the very mention of the "Kurdish issue." Due to Öcalan's active stance, which aligned with this approach, the process focused on the future of the PKK rather than the perspective of resolving the Kurdish issue. This process, with its ambitious and theoretically high expectations, is both politically expansive and politically expansive, due to the limited role assigned to the Parliamentary Commission.

The March 31st Local Elections were a major political leap forward for the CHP, but the (unfortunate) normalization period that followed resulted in significant time loss. The government, ignoring the CHP's adage "strike while the iron is hot," employed them and launched the infamous attack. However, the exact opposite of expectations occurred; the government's attack on the CHP revived the opposition's already dormant reaction. Following the March 19th coup, Özgür Özel chose to ride the coattails of the opposition's strong opposition rather than appease it. The political vitality that Özel has been riding for months—mainly through rallies—has kept the CHP afloat as a popular force. The upward trend in polls demonstrates this.

The opposition public remains oriented toward the CHP, continuing to serve as a driving force for objections and resistance. It has shown strong resistance to attempts to push it out of politics and all processes—despite some internal enthusiasts. The government's attempts to sow discord within the party—again, despite some internal enthusiasts—seem to have been thwarted for now. Efforts like the program congress are attempting to provide context for the claim of an alternative to the ruling party. It's being said that rallies will now emphasize actions rather than complaints. All of these are signs of the CHP's efforts to "hold on to politics," but there's still significant progress to be made before it can break free from its defensive stance and begin producing policy.

The DEM's predecessor, the HDP, was more resistant to the government's indoctrination and pressure to "stay out of politics" during the first peace process—despite being established with the mission of the process. During that period, Demirtaş—with the exception of his Gezi Park stance, which he later amended—adopted an active stance that pushed the boundaries of negotiations and achieved popularity not limited to the Kurdish public. This stance made his 2015 declaration, "We will not make you president," possible and effective. However, the HDP, YSG, and DEM were subsequently driven to a barren path of resisting the government's heavy offensive and being forced into alliance politics, which viewed politics as a bargaining ground between elites. Key figures, especially Demirtaş, were neutralized—many by imprisonment—and their space was further narrowed by the administration's mandate. The struggle to stay afloat left little energy for political engagement.

In addition to the intense pressure placed upon them, the parties of the Kurdish political movement, due to the peace processes (of which there are actually more than two) and alliance politics, have been driven to a partial political inertia, which they have partially accepted. Just as the CHP struggled for many years, they have shown no desire to offer their supporters anything more than "trust us and wait." Their recent performance, in particular, has been shaped by a mission to evade politics—as Bahçeli stated in his initial statement. Nuray Mert's article, outlining the tactical and strategic problems and highlighting the scarcity of political capital, provides a good summary. The government's (especially the AKP's) desire to use the Democratic People's Party (DEM) as a buffer zone to mitigate the damage is attracting those seeking a comfortable, noisy environment towards the Kurds.

"Secular nationalist" parties, which began to be treated as "opposition's chance" after 2019 and almost like opposition co-chairs after 2022 (claiming to be moving towards the center), are the fastest to escape politics. These groups, considered the natural partners of the democracy bloc and the formula for winning elections, attempted to be the losers in both elections, some by adhering to their loyal plans and others by imposing their own determinants. Their refusal to abandon this role, due to their inability to produce anything else, could be chalked up to a lack of political capital, but their continued popularity within the opposition is truly difficult to understand. The official and unofficial spokespeople of these parties remain the most popular guests on the CHP media. Some research institutions and academics also "voluntarily" appear in their advertisements.

The İYİP, Zafer Party, and Anahtar Party teams, using the process, quickly filled the vacant positions in the ruling parties' (AKP-MHP) decade-long campaign of "beating Kurds and anyone who speaks with them." Forgetting even the immigration issue, which they claimed would define all politics just two years ago, they poured their limited capital into a rhetoric adorned with accusations of "despicableness" and "treason"—all freely available explanations. They believe there's a void in this area, distance themselves from the CHP, which is draining their base, and take the position of a perfectly harmless (safe), even reasonable, opposition party. They strengthen the bargaining power of the ruling party, which claims "this process has nothing to do with democracy," against the Democratic Left Party (DEM), which it has cornered as "maximalist."

Teams like DEVA, Gelecek, Saadet, and the New Welfare Party, which have distanced themselves from the AKP at various stages, are still watching the road, just like those hoping for a return of center-right voters. The belief that the "National Vision" base, Islamists, and conservative democrats, which are believed to still exist, will eventually wake up or become enraged and turn their backs on the AKP, even if it holds a group together, doesn't really appeal to voters. They haven't been able to provide convincing answers to the circles they expected to leave the AKP about why and where they left. Conversely, it seems their attempt to sell their "conservative neighborhood familiarity" to the other neighborhood—a practice that doesn't even work for them—is coming to an end. Now, they seem to have no more political options than negotiating a "readmission agreement."

We witnessed left-wing parties, which received popular support during the 2023 election-focused political mobilization, begin to attract significant interest from the opposition. Left-wing opposition parties, particularly the TİP (Turkish Progressive Party), showed a trend of increasing membership and media visibility. However, the failure to maintain this trend over time stems not only from voters' desire to rally around the powerful CHP to achieve results, but also from the inability to generate alternative political moves and develop a distinct language or agenda. Just as in politics in general, the left-wing opposition appears to be struggling to find compelling voices to support, rather than actors who will carry their voice (attract attention), and even fails to dedicate sufficient energy to this. Efforts to establish positions within existing lines, as the TKP has done, are also extremely counterproductive, a search for comfort.

As can be seen, institutional politics, both in power and in opposition, is facing a severe capacity problem. In fact, the issue of distance from politics also applies to the masses of voters who, for a long time, have focused entirely on tactical developments under pressure to achieve results. The fact that party organizations and media have avoided the real political arena and become parties to narrow-minded power struggles is also a significant factor. Of course, in this negative picture, the government's emphasis on anti-political instruments and its practices that have further narrowed the political space can be considered serious mitigating factors. Those who might be justified in saying, "There's space, so why aren't we engaging in politics?" might be justified in dismissing all this turmoil as political may seem overly theoretical or "maximalist." However, if one considers who benefits from this picture, perhaps one should heed the criticisms.

The AKP, about to complete a quarter-century-long period in power in Turkish political history, has benefited from the benefits of apoliticism not only during its final (ten-year) period, when authoritarianism escalated, but from the very beginning. The neoliberal architecture, needing an "engine overhaul" in the early 2000s, began by driving politics out of the field with a heavy ideological assault, much like the 1980 coup. E-memorandums on one side, tutelage debates on the other, the EU agenda on the other, and those being disposed of one by one without a single word. Anti-politics forced everyone to observe a "struggle" among elites, far removed from preferences, demands, objections, and needs, in the humming hills. Erdoğan, who ascended to power in this atmosphere, never forgot the connection between staying there and the perpetuation of this mediocrity. The only thing that will put an end to this comfort of power is its high political production capacity, countered by its anti-political capabilities.