ANALYSIS: Is Türkiye becoming more irreligious?

According to a comprehensive survey conducted by the KONDA company with 6,137 people, the rate of those who described themselves as "religious" decreased from 55 percent in 2008 to 46 percent in 2025. In contrast, the rate of those who said they were "atheists and non-believers" increased from 2 percent to 8 percent.

While the results were being discussed in the media, Dr. Bülent Güven also made an assessment on the subject.

In his analysis published in Independent Turkish, Dr. Güven compared the current situation and the changes that have occurred in Turkey and the West since the 1980s:

Türkiye has not yet become atheistic, but the fact that there are some problems regarding religion and belief in Türkiye is a fact that can attract the attention of anyone who observes.

A survey conducted by KONDA Research on religious trends in Türkiye revealed that there have been remarkable changes in belief over the last 16 years.

According to a comprehensive study, the rate of those who described themselves as "religious" was 55 percent in 2008, but this rate dropped to 46 percent in 2025.

In contrast, the proportion of "atheist and non-believer" individuals increased from 2 percent to 8 percent.

Studies conducted by research companies other than KONDA confirm that there is a decline in religiosity in Türkiye.

In fact, outside of the research, when any citizen of the Republic of Turkey or a foreigner who regularly visits Türkiye makes any observations about this issue, it is quite possible to observe the conclusions reached by the research companies.

How is it that in a society where 10-15 years ago it was claimed that "99 percent of the population was Muslim", the rate of non-believers suddenly dropped to 8 percent and the rate of religious people dropped to 46 percent?

When this secularization in society comes to the fore, the blame is usually placed on the AK Party government and the attitudes and behaviors of religious communities that became more visible during this period of power.

Undoubtedly, the mistakes made by the AK Party and the religious communities have contributed to the formation of this process.

However, this perspective is a superficial approach that ignores sociological dynamics.

The fundamental dynamic of secularization or moving away from religion in Türkiye should be sought in the rapid urbanization that has been experienced since the 1980s and in the neoliberal policies that have become Türkiye's fundamental economic paradigm since this period.

The urbanization rate, which was around 20 percent in 1980, has exceeded 93 percent, including the provincial and district populations, by 2024.

In 1980, before the neoliberal economic model known as the "January 24 Decisions" was implemented by Turgut Özal, Türkiye's economic model was a semi-statist, import-substituting and closed model.

With the January 24 Decisions, statism was eliminated in Türkiye through privatization, exports were supported, and an outward-oriented economic model was implemented.

The reflection of urbanization and the open economic model on society was individualization, migration from villages to cities, and integration with the world.

This situation led to the dissolution of existing value judgments in society, human relations and old social structures, and sometimes to the substitution of new structures and sometimes to the creation of gaps.

It is possible to define the reflection of this new social reality on religious beliefs and the social structures arising from these beliefs as an "erosion of values".

A person who lives in the city, works every weekday, and lives in an apartment naturally becomes distant or disconnected from society and community life, causing him to become alienated from the values ​​of that society and community.

This new neoliberal environment and urban life erodes the values ​​that a religious or conservative person wants to preserve, leading to a process that separates the person from their roots.

This situation can manifest itself in many areas, from marriage and divorce rates to social solidarity and kinship relations.

Countries such as the US, UK and Germany , which implemented similar economic models after the 1980s, faced the situation Turkey is facing today much earlier.

The interesting thing is that in the 1980s, conservative parties were in power in these countries.

These parties came to power by emphasizing moral and religious values ​​in their election campaigns.

For example, in the 1983 elections in Germany, the election slogan of the Christian Democratic Party's candidate for chancellor, Helmut Kohl, was "Spiritual and moral transformation" (Geistige und moralische Wende).

However, by the end of Helmut Kohl's 16-year term as Prime Minister, who came to power with such rhetoric, divorce rates in Germany had doubled, religiosity had decreased, and homosexuality had become more legitimate in society.

Moreover, the transformation of social values ​​caused by the neoliberal policies implemented by Kohl paved the way for the essentially secular Social Democrats to come to power after him.

Similar processes occurred in other Western countries that adopted the same neoliberal model, especially the USA and the UK.

It is possible to see the social transformation that has occurred with this secularization through numbers.

For example, in a country like the USA, which was originally founded by devout Protestants, the rate of people attending church on Sundays was over 40 percent in the 1980s, but today this rate has fallen to 20 percent.

In countries such as Germany and the UK, this rate has dropped to 5-6 percent.

A similar rise is seen among people who declare they have no religious affiliation, known as "Nones."

While the proportion of people included in this group was around 1-3 percent in the 1980s, today this rate has exceeded 20 percent.

As mentioned above, secularization and disbelief are increasing in individualized and urbanized societies as a result of neoliberal policies.

KONDA's research also reveals that this transformation in the religious structure in Türkiye, albeit with some delay, is similar to what is happening in Western countries.

That is, similar social processes produce similar outcomes.

So, what should those who feel uncomfortable with this process do?

What should those groups, communities, or relevant state institutions that are disturbed by the development of the disbelief process do?

Or should we support the progress of this secularization process, which is actually a Republican project, without being disturbed by it?

First of all, it is natural for a believer to be uncomfortable with this process.

It would not be fair to say that the current government is satisfied with this process.

Therefore, it is clear that those who are uncomfortable with this process must do something.