Turning Point, Part 2: What is needed for rearmament now

Perhaps the real turning point only came last week, when the President of the United States sided with the warmonger Vladimir Putin and publicly insulted the previously friendly Ukraine. Three years ago, when the German Chancellor first used the word, conditions were still relatively comfortable; the Europeans had the Western superpower on their side against the Russian threat. Now they are completely alone.

Everything they wanted to get started in 2022 must now go even faster and much further. Until now, military circles have said that by 2029, Putin's army could be ready to attack NATO territory. But will that still be the case if Trump withdraws even a portion of the 90,000 American troops currently stationed in Europe - especially the 20,000 troops that outgoing President Joe Biden sent to other countries, namely the Baltic states, Poland and Romania, after Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

Nobody can say today whether America can still be relied upon in the event of an alliance. Europe must expect to be on its own. And time is running out to prepare for this scenario. One thing is clear: anyone who wants to have powerful armed forces in a few years' time must set the course for this now; in fact, they should have done so years ago.

The question arises about production capacities in the arms industry, which were cut back everywhere after the end of the Cold War , and the question arises about the money that will be used to pay for all of this. After all, many European countries are already struggling with budget shortfalls.

The stocks of military equipment have fallen significantly in recent decades (see graphic). The number of tanks in the Bundeswehr 's stocks has fallen from 2,398 to 339, according to calculations by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. If replacement continues at the current pace, it will take decades to reach the stocks of 2004 - and in the case of howitzers, a full century, researchers estimate.

All of this costs money, a lot of money. The 100 billion euros in special loans that the Bundestag approved three years ago for rearmament will be used up by 2027. From 2028 onwards, at least 30 billion euros will be short of the budget every year if even just two percent of economic output is to flow into the army, which is already considered too little in the new situation.

And the bottom line is that the parties' election manifestos do not bring in any new revenue, but rather new budget gaps. "For me, by the way, it was interesting that a special fund for defense capability is highly accepted by the population," said CDU General Secretary Carsten Linnemann in a recent FAS interview. Even though he denied this when asked, this could safely be understood as a subtle hint that loans could also be used for armaments in the future.

But money alone is not enough. The equipment, the ammunition, all of that has to be produced somewhere.

The European Union has now appointed a defence commissioner for the first time, Andrius Kubilius. The former Lithuanian prime minister is to develop a kind of master plan that will prepare Europe and its member states "for the most extreme military eventualities", as it is said, and quantify the investment required for this. He plans to present his results in March.

For a credible European deterrent, for example to prevent a rapid Russian breakthrough in the Baltics, Europe needs 300,000 soldiers in addition to existing NATO plans, with a focus on mechanized and armored units, according to an analysis by the renowned Brussels think tank Bruegel. In concrete terms, this means at least 1,400 additional tanks, 2,000 armored personnel carriers and 700 artillery systems, according to the authors.

Germany is one of the most important countries in Western Europe for ammunition production and also has important expertise in shipbuilding, tank construction and radar systems. In this respect, the Federal Republic is likely to play an important role in the plans of the new Defense Commissioner. It will be crucial to ramp up production in these key areas much more quickly than before.

The Kiel Institute for the World Economy calculates that the estimated delivery times are between two and five years. For the other half of the orders, however, no delivery date is given. Apparently, the companies are finding it difficult to make firm delivery promises to the armies. "This trend indicates that production bottlenecks may have become a bigger problem," the study says.

Indeed, the capacity of the industry has been steadily reduced since the end of the Cold War. This is also due to the fact that Germany still has strict export regulations for military equipment. Some of its European neighbours are more generous, and manufacturers there find it difficult to cooperate with German manufacturers. Further reforms could encourage more exports and thus a more rapid build-up of capacity - which could then be used for domestic procurement in the medium term.

"Compared to our capabilities, we are often still working in small series, in manufacturing mode, so to speak," says Hans-Christoph Atzpodien, CEO of the Federal Association of the German Security and Defense Industry. As soon as long-term prospects with high order prospects are available, the companies will quickly expand their production capacities. "Progress depends on the incoming government finally setting the right course for the further growth of the defense budget."

Many economists also believe that demand will create supply. The development of a European arms industry is being offset by cuts in related sectors, especially in the steel and automotive industries. Unlike ten years ago, industrial and human resources are therefore available.

"The economic downturn is worth its weight in gold for the arms industry," says Carlo Masala, professor of international politics at the University of the German Armed Forces in Munich. "Many skilled workers are being laid off." Many car companies and their suppliers are already linked to the arms industry : Daimler Truck produces military vehicles, the supplier ZF in Friedrichshafen supplies transmissions for these trucks, other car suppliers also manufacture components for tanks. Professions such as industrial mechanic, metalworker, mechatronics engineer or welder are important in both industries.

This is reminiscent of the conversion in the 1990s, when resources from the arms industry were rededicated for civilian purposes. Only this time it is the other way round. Today, companies and skilled workers who fall victim to the structural change in industry could help with the production of tanks, artillery ammunition or howitzers. For example, former Continental employees whose jobs at the Lower Saxony site in Gifhorn are being eliminated will soon be hired by Rheinmetall in nearby Unterlüß.

These examples in particular show that even in Germany things can move quickly if the political will is there. The new ammunition factory in Unterlüß is due to start production soon, after a construction period of just one year. And in Görlitz, Saxony, a contract was signed a few weeks ago in the presence of the Federal Chancellor, which provides for the conversion of the former wagon factory into a factory for tank parts.

However, the supply of raw materials could become a bottleneck. Germany is not the only country that wants to become war-ready, and Europe is not the only continent that wants to rearm. Manufacturers wait up to 18 months for armor steel, which is often imported from South Korea, says expert Masala. In Europe, there is currently only one major manufacturer, the Swedish company SSAB.

Other components are also rare on the world markets: propellant charges, nitrocellulose, nitric acid. The United States wants to start producing the explosive TNT again from 2027 after giving up production in 1986. The reason given is that it wants to retain control over the supply chain. Europe must also ask itself which critical raw materials it should produce itself. At least: Dillinger Hütte in Saarland received certification to produce armor steel in 2021, although it will take some time before production is ramped up.

"Europe has the industrial and technological basis for its own defense," says Christian Mölling, who heads the "Europe's Future" program at the Bertelsmann Foundation. It is crucial to close certain capability gaps, for example in air defense and/or cruise missiles that can hit targets at great distances.

However, things get more complicated when it comes to nuclear deterrence. Here, the dependence on the United States is undisputed. France and England do have nuclear warheads, but they are strategic in nature and can hit targets at great distances with great destructive power. There are hardly any tactical nuclear weapons in the arsenal, Masala stresses. "But you need them to actually push the enemy back on the front line." Building up a European nuclear power of its own will take many years: "It's not a quick fix ." Of all the major defense tasks, nuclear deterrence is probably the most complex challenge, also from a political point of view.

However, it is not only with nuclear weapons that the question arises as to who in the diverse chorus of Europeans coordinates procurement and deployment. "Before Europe buys weapons, it must replace something that is more difficult to compensate for: the political and military leadership of the USA," says expert Mölling. "Without the ability and authority to lead, even more weapons are useless: Who decides which ones are bought? On the basis of which defense plans? And who authorizes their deployment?"

All of this could work as long as there is an acute sense of crisis and the shock of Trump's Russia turn is still fresh. But what happens if the issue of a ceasefire in Ukraine slips down the priority list for the time being?

That may seem hard to imagine these days, but every crisis has its own economic cycle. This is also the case with other issues: almost five years ago, in the middle of the Corona lockdown, politicians wanted to better prepare for the next pandemic. This issue, too, was forgotten.