The democratic illusion, once again at stake
What kind of Argentina will vote next Sunday? What is the social geography that underlies the rational decisions and emotions that guide each citizen's choice? What lies behind the determination of many to stay home and not participate? The noise of the campaign, the polls, and the competition between the main political forces seem to have a more limited effect this time, compared to the big questions that underlie the in-depth picture that will be the national elections on October 26.
In 2023, Argentine society approached the elections in a historic crisis. Disenchanted with the Peronist government and finding no appeal in Together for Change, it vacillated for several months until Javier Milei offered an unknown shortcut to that crossroads. People were looking for a change of era, a turning of the page, and Milei offered them that promise. And a majority clung to that hope.
Reviewing public opinion polls, examining economic and social indicators, and listening to the voices of specialists, the outlook doesn't differ much from that of two years ago . Uncertainty and a sense of disillusionment once again dominate, with pockets of expectation among those staunch supporters of the libertarians.
The government's approval rating has plummeted in recent months, but at the same time, Peronism is only appealing through its role as an instrument of anger against the ruling party, with few resources to attract voters outside its core voters and regenerate an attractive alternative. Observing the tone of the campaign and analyzing the candidate lineup, it seems that Sunday's election doesn't deserve to have winners.
Milei proposes a world without Kirchnerism; Fuerza Patria calls for a limit to Milei. These are two classic discourses of rejection that operate in a context of frayed polarization, because it coexists with a very intense complementary dynamic: that of a disillusionment that already seems chronic. Polarization combined with disillusionment, a combination that denotes a high level of social disintegration and ultimately paralyzes the possibility of a virtuous resolution to the impasse.
As Rodolfo Terragno recently pointed out in a column published in Clarín, the alternations between democracy and dictatorship (which dominated 20th-century Argentina) and neoliberalism and populism (which remains in force in the 21st century) “have created a hybrid and unstable political and economic system.”
Historian Roy Hora links the perception of the present with the climate of two years ago, saying that “in 2023, many of us thought the crisis was moving toward some kind of resolution, based on the widespread perception that Argentina couldn't continue as it was. It seemed that Milei was that resolution, that the Argentine crisis had finally taken a direction . But in recent months, I've had the impression that we're facing another failed experiment, one that's running into the same kinds of difficulties as previous projects.”
The deeper question then arises in this regard: does Milei have anything more to offer, or was his mission accomplished when he broke the political chessboard of the two major coalitions, lowered inflation, and brought order to the macroeconomy? Is this a transitional phenomenon after the imbalances of the last Peronist government, or is it also a factor in rebuilding a new model?
The Milei of 2023 was the anti-establishment outsider , the avenger of the past. He made sense in the face of society's demand for a turning of the page in history. What does Milei represent in 2025? The social mandate is very clear: his administration will be evaluated essentially by his ability to reactivate the economy , restore purchasing power, and improve employment. This was the response of 47% of those surveyed by Isonomía when asked what it would mean for Milei to ultimately be successful in his administration. Other variables, such as controlling inflation (10%), which dominated the initial agenda, and the cultural struggle (11%), appeared far behind.
And in this regard, the government appears to have taken several steps backward this year. A thorough study by the consulting firm Equilibra, conducted by Martín Rapetti, Lorenzo Sigaut Gravina , and Gonzalo Carrera , uses hard data to break down what they call "the root of disenchantment," a play on words between the income curve and the square root symbol.
There they point out that in the income of the registered sectors, "after an initial drop of 19% compared to the average for January-September 2023, there was a partial recovery until February 2025 (94% of the previous level), followed by stagnation and a slight decline, in line with the evolution of economic activity."
According to the study, during the first 20 months of Milei's administration, this sector lost the equivalent of 2.1 months of real income , which would explain the deeper underlying social unrest and perceptions of disenchantment. Furthermore, this process is much more pronounced in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area than in the country's interior , a key reason for the ruling party's electoral difficulties in the province of Buenos Aires. The Equilibra report also establishes a strong correlation between this income curve and the Di Tella University's government confidence index, a highly effective predictor of electoral performance.
The results are consistent with another study by the consulting firm Escenarios, led by Federico Zapata and Pablo Touzón, according to which 53% of respondents say they can't make ends meet with their income, and 30% say they make ends meet "just enough." This widened the gap between negative (55%) and positive (34%) perceptions of how people imagine the country's economic situation a year from now. This narrowing of expectations for the future , which had been a driving force behind the 2024 Milei model, has led to a decline.
This has an impact not only on the libertarian government, but on the system as a whole, an indication that emerges in the set of questions related to democratic performance. While there is overwhelming support for the system, 71% report being "dissatisfied" with the functioning of democracy , according to Escenarios.
Natalio Botana gives meaning to this distinction when he speaks of a "legitimacy of origin" of the democratic system, based on regular elections and a broad range of candidates, where Argentina has clearly advanced since its reinstatement in 1983; and a "legitimacy of results," linked to the concrete effect of this institutional functioning on economic and social growth, where he understands the balance is deficient. Democracy also suffers erosion when it cannot satisfactorily respond to the concrete demands of the people.
Its most visible electoral expression is the absenteeism observed throughout the year. According to a survey by the consulting firm Mide, 50% of those who did not vote in this year's provincial elections did so because of "fatigue/disappointment/lack of representation," 28% because they consider politicians corrupt, and 12% because they feel their vote "is meaningless," "a waste of time," and "nothing will change."
Juan Germano , from Isonomía, wonders whether there is a "chronic absenteeism," which would extend the low turnout from the provincial elections to Sunday's elections and speak of a climate of the times; or if it is simply a "PASO effect," which would portend that after the apathy demonstrated throughout the year, people will turn out en masse in the decisive vote. He draws on recent history, considering that in 2019, between the primaries and the general elections, 2.7 million voters turned out, and in 2023 there were 2.9 million more, although these were presidential elections.
In any case, it's clear that there's a dysfunction in the system that has been worsening. With one exception (in 2017), Argentine society has changed its vote every two years since 2007, in a desperate search for answers that the leadership doesn't seem able to provide. It seemed like a problem of the old Kirchnerism-Macrism polarization, but now Milei could also fall prey to the same trap if she fails to win next Sunday.
Within this general context, public opinion polls are revealing some indicators that provide a guideline for what might happen in the coming week. In particular, one political-attitudinal question: how voters in each sector are positioned. Three ways of approaching the electoral challenge can be identified.
The first of these corresponds to voters loyal to La Libertad Avanza. There is a hard core that remains firmly behind Milei, which according to consultant Shila Vilker hovers around 25% , and a softer segment, around 15% , that is disenchanted with the government but at the same time very reactive to Kirchnerism.
This last, more volatile group, mostly unpredictable after the collapse of JxC, is the key that will determine the fate of the election, because it is the one that must decide whether to reaffirm its intention to vote for 2023 or, as it has done so far in the provincial elections, stay home without voting. It is the central subject of this dispute. Isonomía describes them as "siperistas" (the "siperists"), those who validate the libertarian achievements but at the same time doubt Milei's ability to deal with the crisis.
A cruel dilemma hangs over them: will disenchantment with a government they've grown hopeful about prevail in their decision, or will their rejection of a possible return of Kirchnerism be stronger? Will it be resigned indifference or the activation of resistance? The President desperately needs to mobilize these voters to enter the voting booth with a chance of winning. They are the ones who must renew his loan, even though he only fulfilled part of the initial contract. The Casa Rosada is confident they can retain them despite the string of errors and problems in the campaign, and that's why they say they see "a close election."
These questions are particularly relevant to young people, who were a decisive factor two years ago and now seem more distant. This is a fact noted by sociologist Pablo Seman in his field studies, because "these voters, who were the most hopeful in 2023 and who told their parents they had to vote for Milei, are now seeing them suffer economically and can no longer keep telling them the same thing. They are beginning to hesitate between their political loyalty and the reality they see around them."
The second segment is Fuerza Patria's voters, who have regrouped after the government's setbacks, but have also failed to expand their reach much. They managed to consolidate their historical base through their fierce opposition, and that was enough to survive a watered-down campaign. The Kirchnerites claim their polls predict a heavy defeat for the government.
Shila Vilker offers two ideas that could be decisive for this spectrum. One: "The yes vote is softer; the no vote, on the other hand, is more assertive." In other words, another election is approaching where rejection of the proposal prevails. Another: "This is more an election of punishment than of building an alternative for 2027." That's why Kirchnerism feels comfortable simply impeaching Milei, without giving any indication of how it envisions the future.
The third segment is made up of the rest of the political forces , ranging from the six governors of the United Provinces (represented in 16 districts) and the other five leaders without national references ( Gustavo Sáenz , from Salta; Hugo Passalacqua , from Misiones; Rolando Figueroa, from Neuquén; Alberto Weretilneck , from Río Negro, and Marcelo Orrego , from San Juan), to other local forces and the left, which could make a notable election in some localities.
This heterogeneous universe exposes the fragmentation of the political landscape and can be fueled by both disenchantment with Milei and the limitations of Peronism. They seek to be the tributaries of disillusionment and challenge polarization, but they do not form a solid core. Just as the disillusionment of its soft voters influences the libertarian world, and a firm but static core dominates Peronism, this third sector is governed by dispersion and choice by default . It is an intermediate stage before the season of absenteeism.
Three reflections in the epilogue. One: the organizing question of the vote revolves around Milei's presidential performance, not her Kirchnerist past , although that memory is vivid and continues to influence. If she wins, it will be her merit; if she loses, it will be her responsibility. There will be much less talk of a Peronist victory than of a government defeat.
Two: the composition of Congress will not change in essence. No one will have a majority; the first minority will be Peronism, and the LLA, which will be the force with the most seats, could reach a third of the House of Representatives with the good offices of those closest to it. But this is a two-phase election: one will be revealed on October 26 with the vote count, and the other will take place thereafter, depending on Milei's management of the results, how she handles the new reality, and how much she expands her support base to supplement with political negotiation what the ballot boxes won't fully provide.
Three: Under any circumstances, victory or defeat, the President must profoundly reset his alliances with governors and legislators to advance his proposed reforms and not just defend vetoes with a third of Congress; introduce a redesign of his cabinet and his power structure to overcome internal conflicts and establish a virtuous decision-making mechanism; and adjust the economic plan , not only to stabilize the monetary system but also to make the leap from the fiscal to the productive stage. Without these redefinitions, elections will lose their deepest meaning, and their civic expression will be diluted once again in the vast valley of disenchantment.

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